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Abstract
We propose enhancing a recongurable and extensible embedded RISC processor core with
a protected zone for isolated execution of cryptographic algorithms. The protected zone is a
collection of processor subsystems such as functional units optimized for high-speed execution
of integer operations, a small amount of local memory for storing sensitive data during crypto-
graphic computations, and special-purpose and cryptographic registers to execute instructions
securely. We outline the principles for secure software implementations of cryptographic algo-
rithms in a processor equipped with the proposed protected zone. We demonstrate the eciency
and eectiveness of our proposed zone by implementing the most-commonly used cryptographic
algorithms in the protected zone; namely RSA, elliptic curve cryptography, pairing-based cryp-
tography, AES block cipher, and SHA-1 and SHA-256 cryptographic hash functions. In terms
of time eciency, our software implementations of cryptographic algorithms running on the en-
hanced core compare favorably with equivalent software implementations on similar processors
reported in the literature. The protected zone is designed in such a modular fashion that it can
easily be integrated into any RISC processor. The proposed enhancements for the protected
Preliminary version of this paper has been presented at Recong 2009 [1].
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zone are realized on an FPGA device. The implementation results on the FPGA conrm that
its area overhead is relatively moderate in the sense that it can be used in many embedded
processors. Finally, the protected zone is useful against cold-boot and micro-architectural side-
channel attacks such as cache-based and branch prediction attacks.
Keywords: Cryptography, Cryptographic Unit, Isolated Execution, Instruction Set Extension,
Secure Computing, Attacks.
1 Introduction
Secure and ecient implementations of cryptographic algorithms have become more of a focal point
for research in cryptographic engineering since various attacks [2, 3, 4, 5] (i.e., timing, power analy-
sis, fault, and branch prediction attacks, respectively) successfully compromise realizations of many
cryptosystems which are believed to be secure under computational or similar assumptions in theory.
Since general-purpose processors fulll neither the timing nor the security constraints of crypto-
graphic applications due to dierent set of design considerations, special-purpose cryptographic
co-processors are built to remedy this problematic. Nevertheless, cryptographic co-processors turn
out to be not entirely free from security concerns and furthermore, introduce their own problems
such as security risks and speed considerations accrued in host processor/co-processor setting.
Aware of inadequacy of software-only solutions, computer manufacturers already introduced
hardware extensions to their processor cores to accelerate cryptographic computations such as In-
tel's AES instruction set [6] and to provide secure execution environment. A notable development
is that new architectures introduced by three major manufacturers [7, 8, 9] allow that security-
sensitive applications execute in an environment strictly free from the intervention of other si-
multaneously running processes. This feature is known as process isolation and enforced by the
hardware. A strictly enforced process isolation is denitely benecial in thwarting an important
class of attacks known as micro-architectural side-channel attacks [10, 5]. However, without hard-
ware support many practical attacks [5, 11, 4, 10, 2, 3, 12], in fact, cannot be easily prevented by
software-only countermeasures. This is such a general understanding that many counter-measures
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proposed in the literature [13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18] are implemented below the software level. From
these observations, developments and results, the need for further research in new computer ar-
chitectures that support ecient and secure implementations of cryptographic algorithms becomes
obvious.
In this paper, we investigate the realization of a protected zone in a recongurable embedded
processor that provides cryptographic algorithms with a highly secure execution environment. The
protected zone consists of architectural subsystems of a local memory, registers, and functional
units and enables a much more strict process isolation in the sense that sensitive information never
leaks outside the zone. For acceleration of basic arithmetic operations, we use and improve the
design principles presented in [19, 20]. The goal of accelerating many cryptographic algorithms
(AES, hash functions, elliptic curve cryptography, RSA, Pairing-based cryptography) has a major
inuence on the design of the functional units and the organization of the protected zone. For
instance, the functional units are designed to enable fast modular arithmetic for numbers in the
range of [160, 2048] bits (which are the precisions used in the public key algorithms; i.e., elliptic
curve cryptography, RSA, Pairing-based cryptography) without an unacceptable increase in chip
area and any decrease in clock frequency. Similarly, an optimum number of cryptographic registers
and an optimum amount of local memory are determined to accelerate these public key algorithms.
The organization of the protected zone is highly modular, and complies with the design prin-
ciples of RISC processors, therefore, it can be incorporated into any RISC processor. We also
demonstrate that well-known cryptographic algorithms, RSA, ECC, pairing-based cryptography,
AES, SHA-1, and SHA-256 can be implemented on an embedded processor equipped with the pro-
tected zone with superior time performance, eciency, and high-level security. A similar approach
is used in [21] only for AES implementation; however the proposed technique in [21] cannot easily be
extended to more complicated public key algorithms. We provide a complete, generic approach that
is readily applicable to any cryptographic algorithm and does not necessitate Assembly language
implementation, which is essential in [21].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: We summarize the related work and our contri-
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butions in Section 2. Section 3 outlines our methodology used in the design of the protected zone.
Section 4 introduces the general architecture and how the protected zone is incorporated into a
classic embedded RISC processor. A small amount of local memory, which is an essential part of the
protected zone is explained in Section 5. In software implementations of cryptographic algorithms,
general-purpose registers, which are not a part of the protected zone but the base processor core,
need to be used. We show how to use these general-purpose registers securely in Section 6. Sec-
tion 7 presents the new instructions, which are realized on the protected zone and useful in secure
execution of certain operations in cryptographic applications. The timing results for the software
implementations of major cryptographic algorithms are given, when they are implemented on our
processor enhanced with the protected zone, in Section 8. The implementation results of the pro-
tected zone and the base processor core on FPGA and ASIC are presented in Section 9. The paper
is concluded in Section 10 by summarizing the achievements.
2 Related Work and Our Contribution
While modifying microprocessor architectures for speed and security is a common method in the
literature, the objectives and approaches in particular solutions dier. The works in [13], [15], [17],
[22], and [18] aim to provide a secure computing environment for protecting all applications and
their data against software and hardware attacks. In [13] and [17] the internal state of the processor
is protected. In [15], the Secret-Protecting (SP) architecture ensures that all data and codes of
a software module are encrypted when they are o the chip. The secure processor architecture
in [22] protects a trusted hypervisor, which protects other trusted software modules. Finally, the
architecture in [18] adopts a secure processor model, where CPU core and cache are protected using
encryption and memory integrity verication modules. The model envisages that the computing
system is divided into two parts: i) trusted on-chip modules (e.g., CPU core, cache memory, reg-
isters, encryption/decryption engine, and memory integrity verication module) and ii) untrusted
o-chip modules (external memory and external peripherals). Any data that goes out of the chip
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is encrypted and any data coming from the o-chip modules into the trusted chip is veried for
tamper resistance. The architecture features an AES engine and a true random number generator
as cryptographic units.
Other architectures modify or extend processor cores mostly for accelerating the cryptographic
algorithms [23], [24]. There are also other architectures, which propose solutions for both secure
and fast execution of cryptographic algorithms [19], [21], [1] and [20]. A recent work in [24] explores
design possibilities for accelerating cryptographic algorithms while secure execution is not consid-
ered. We compare our architecture and that in [24] in terms of the execution speed of cryptographic
algorithms and the relative overhead of the processor extensions.
The approach in our previous work in [1], which also provides a generic support for many
cryptographic algorithms for speed and security, is the closest to the approach adopted in this
work. While the work in [1], which presents our preliminary results, introduces the essentials of our
approach, this work provides substantially new contributions, which can be summarized as follows:
 We introduce a novel secure table lookup technique that benets the s-box computation in
all block ciphers. We implement the AES algorithm using this new technique; and the new
implementation outperforms the implementation in [1] by a large margin.
 Besides RSA and elliptic curve cryptography, we implement the Tate pairing operation for
pairing-based cryptographic protocols, which are common in many security protocols. Our
implementation outperforms a comparable implementation on an extended embedded pro-
cessor in [25] by about a factor of 2. The software implementations of many new arithmetic
operations in dierent algebraic elds required for Pairing-based cryptography are also ob-
tained.
 We show how to implement a cryptographic hash function securely in our new processor.
We implement SHA-1 and SHA-256 (256-bit version of SHA-2) algorithms using the secure
execution principles and list the performance results.
 We include implementation details for new instructions for secure execution of cryptographic
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algorithms and a rationale behind them, which are omitted in [1] due to space considerations.
 We demonstrate as to how to use general-purpose registers, which are already available in the
base processor in a secure manner in cryptographic computations.
 We introduce the use of a local memory for secure execution and show that only a small
amount of local memory is sucient for the implementations of a wide range of cryptographic
algorithms. We also include some remarks about the feasibility of implementing it on-chip in
an embedded microprocessor.
 Developing secure implementation of cryptographic algorithms requires neither advanced As-
sembly programming nor expert level knowledge in micro-architectural details of the proces-
sor. The development can be done in high-level languages (C and C++ in our case) with
only a minor exception where a couple of inline Assembly statements are added to track the
use of general-purpose registers for sensitive data.
 Optimizations are performed to improve the performance and the eciency of the proposed
architecture. One important example is in the reduction of the number of the cryptographic
registers. In our earlier design, there are 32 cryptographic registers. Now, the current design
uses only 8 cryptographic registers, which results in a considerable reduction in area. We
show that reducing the number of the cryptographic registers did not have any adverse eect
on the time performance of cryptographic algorithms for considerably large key sizes. We also
reduce the number of the predicate registers from two to one, used in the protection against
branch prediction attacks.
This work is a crucial step in an attempt to build a secure architecture for the execution of
cryptographic algorithms. Since it essentially proposes an isolated execution space for cryptographic
algorithms, it can provide protection against a wide range of attacks when combined with other
types of countermeasures in the literature. For instance, arithmetic codes in [26, 27] can be used
in the design of the functional units in our architecture to protect a wide range of public key
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cryptography algorithms against fault attacks. Similarly, countermeasures at logic gate-level as
proposed in [14], when applied in our protected zone, will provide protection against dierential
power analysis attacks. After all, the protected zone can be implemented in a chip area, on which
various gate-level countermeasures can be applied eectively. Since no secret or sensitive data
leaves the zone, they can be protected against attacks such as side channel and fault attacks.
3 Principles and Requirements of Secure and Isolated Execution
Software implementations of cryptographic algorithms are vulnerable to various forms of attacks
that can be grouped into two main classes: side-channel [2, 3, 5] and fault-injection attacks [4].
The side-channel attack in [2] takes advantage of key-dependent variations in execution times of
cryptographic algorithms while the dierential power analysis attack in [3] utilizes variations in
power usage during cryptographic computations. The side-channel attack in [5] is a timing attack
using the time variations due to branch mispredictions. In the second category, fault-injection
attacks [4] utilize incorrect outputs of a cryptographic algorithm due to faults deliberately in-
duced by an adversary to nd out the secret key. Dierent countermeasures from circuit- [14]
through architectural- [16] to algorithmic-levels [28] have been proposed. It has, however, been
well-understood that ultimate protection against all kinds of attacks seems to be dicult and
dierent counter-measures need to be deployed against dierent attacks for reasonably secure im-
plementations of cryptographic algorithms.
In this paper, we deal with mainly architecture-level attacks and countermeasures. In particular,
the proposed countermeasures provide resilience against cache-based, branch prediction, and to
some extent simple power analysis attacks. Therefore, countermeasures proposed for lower levels
(e.g., circuit level) against fault analysis and dierential power analysis attacks are beyond the scope
of this work. We emphasize that a good protection against known attacks (mainly side-channel and
fault induction attacks against hardware and software implementations of cryptographic algorithms)
should combine countermeasures for all levels; i.e. from circuit through architecture (as in our
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approach) to algorithm levels. Notwithstanding, our proposed architecture can still be useful in the
implementation of algorithmic countermeasures as shown in Section 8 such as a countermeasure for
simple power analysis, secure implementation of cryptographic hash functions, and secure lookup
tables. Moreover, circuit level countermeasures can be built into the functional units such as the
multiplier, which denitely broadens the variety of attacks, for which the proposed architecture
provides protection.
A preeminent example of architecture-level attacks is cache-based attacks. Many cryptographic
algorithms utilize lookup tables for fast execution, which makes them vulnerable to cache-based side-
channel attacks [10]. Another form of side-channel attacks that utilizes processor micro-architecture
is named as branch prediction attacks [5]. The main reason that these attacks are eective is the
fact that a majority of general-purpose processors (including many embedded processors) support
multi-tasking and resource sharing as in the cases of cache memories, branch prediction and target
buers. The processes running simultaneously cannot directly access each other's data since the
operating system enforces process isolation. However, processes inadvertently (and inevitably to
a certain degree) leave residue data in shared resources (cache memories and branch buers).
Another process cannot directly use or learn the residue data; however, it can make inferences
through carefully timed accesses to these shared resources. The residue data in shared resources
does not have to be secret or condential per se; but its presence may say something about the
secret that is used to access it. Naturally, during the execution of cryptographic algorithms, secret
keys are used to access lookup tables (hence cache attacks) and to make decisions in the program
execution ow (hence branch prediction attacks).
Worse yet, the bugs and aws in operating systems (OS) render OS-implemented process iso-
lation ineective against sophisticated attacks that allow ill-intentioned programs to gain access
to secret information through the violation of process isolation. This situation calls for a much
stronger, and inevitably hardware-based, mechanism for process isolation. Supporting this claim,
major processor manufacturers such as Intel, AMD, and ARM, introduced extensions to their pro-
cessor cores to fortify the process isolation [7, 8, 9]. The basic principle is to make certain parts of
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memory, of cache, and of TLB used by a process strictly inaccessible by other processes. However,
the isolation is still virtual rather than physical since the data from dierent processes still occupy
the shared resources. For instance, the condential data such as secret keys and temporary vari-
ables will still be present in physical memory in certain points of execution. Recently demonstrated
cold-boot attacks [12] eciently recover secret keys used in cryptographic operations.
Therefore, to provide an even stronger type of process isolation where the cryptographic algo-
rithms execute free from vulnerabilities against the aforementioned attacks, the processor archi-
tecture needs to provide support for keeping all condential information in physically protected
zones. Condential information not only includes secret keys, but all intermediate values obtained
during cryptographic computations. For example, an AES block in an intermediate round is also
condential since its compromise may reveal important information on the secret key1. Similarly,
an intermediate elliptic curve point obtained during elliptic curve scalar multiplication needs to be
protected, since it is possibly a smaller multiple of the base point which gives away certain bits of
the secret integer (possibly the private key). Therefore, there is a need for a protected zone where
we can keep the condential information before, during, and after the cryptographic computation.
The protected zone includes functional units, a small, protected local memory, a cryptographic
register le that we can use during operations, and some special registers to keep intermediate
variables. In what follows, we explain the components of the protected zone.
 Functional units execute the instructions needed in cryptographic computations, which ba-
sically implement simple arithmetic/logic operations. Some operations are needed for secure
execution of cryptographic algorithms to prevent branch prediction attacks as well as to avoid
condential variables appearing in general-purpose registers of the processor.
 Local memory is used to implement a scratch pad for temporary variables and lookup ta-
bles as well as to keep secret keys. The local memory can be implemented either on-chip or
1The compromise of an intermediate AES block is equivalent to using AES with fewer number of rounds than
specied. It is well-known that many block ciphers are shown to be weak if they are executed with fewer number of
rounds.
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outside of the chip; but the important feature is that it is physically protected and not a part
of the memory hierarchy to avoid it from being backed up on higher levels of the hierarchy.
Its implementation is much easier than a cache memory since placement scheme is straight-
forward. The cache memory usage is always problematic in cryptographic algorithms and not
necessarily as benecial as a possible local memory. Some commercially available processors
such as graphic processors and the Cell Broadband Engine Architecture (CBEA) [29] also
feature local memories. It is important to note that the SPE cores (Synergistic Processing
Elements) in CBEA use on-chip local memories in isolation.
 Cryptographic Registers are organized as a register le, from which the functional units
can read their operands. The condential values (secret keys and sensitive temporary values)
are kept and operated on while they are in these registers. Important feature of these registers
is that they are not spilled onto the main memory but to the local memory.
 Special registers are used to keep some temporary values during the long-latency crypto-
graphic computations such as multi-precision modular multiplication and block cipher round
operations.
In the next section, we provide more details about the processor architecture that incorporates
such a protected execution zone for cryptographic operations.
4 General Architecture
The architecture in Figure 1 is proposed to fulll the requirements of secure and isolated execu-
tion of cryptographic algorithms stated in Section 3. The base architecture is essentially a 32-bit
embedded processor core based on Xtensa LX3 architecture by Tensilica [30] that provides the
most basic integer functionality. The architecture is both recongurable and extensible. A basic
pipeline structure with ve stages, a register le of 32 32-bit registers and a simple ALU are default
resources in what is referred as the base architecture whose components are shown in dark in Fig-
10
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Instruction Fetch/Decode
ISA Execution Pipeline
Base Register File
Base ALU
MUL 16/32
MAC 16
         User-Defined 
Secure Execution Units 
User-Defined Register File 
   User-Defined 
Special Registers 
         User-Defined 
Secure Local Memory 
Instruction RAM
Instruction Cache
Data Cache
Data RAM
    Instruction 
Memory MMU
        Data
Memory MMU
Processor Interface
Secure Zone
Base ISA features Configurable Functions User-Defined Extensions
Figure 1: General Architecture
ure 1. The resources shown in the lightest represent congurable parts, which simply means that
a developer/designer can choose to add/remove/congure units already available in the Xtensa
LX3 architecture. For instance, a 16- or 32-bit multiplier and a multiply-and-accumulate unit
(MUL16/32 and MAC 16 in Figure 1, respectively) can be added to the base architecture. The
cache memory size and conguration can also be determined by the designer/developer.
The architecture is extensible in the sense that the designer can add units of her/his own design
such as multi-cycle execution units, register les, special registers for multi-cycle instructions, even
make the basic RISC pipeline into a multi-issue VLIW processor. It is the extensibility feature that
we use to realize our protected zone to execute cryptographic operations as illustrated in Figure 1
(enclosed within the dashed area).
Figure 2 shows the details of the protected zone where we can perform cryptographic operations
safely. The organization of the zone is very similar to an ordinary RISC processor core with the
exception of the 128-bit data path and the block cipher unit. The register le consists of eight 128-
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Protected Zone
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Source Register I
Source Register II
32
32
Destination Register
Base
Register
File
State
Reg.HI/LO
Mult.ShifterIU
Figure 2: Organization of Protected Zone
bit registers, which we refer as cryptographic registers henceforth, and are used to hold operands
during the computation. The execution units, namely integer unit (IU), shifter, and multiplier,
are responsible for executing arithmetic/logic operations common in cryptographic computations
in an ecient and secure manner. While 128-bit shift and arithmetic/logic operations are single-
cycle, the 128 128 multiplication is a multi-cycle operation. For the details of these instructions,
see [19, 20].
The block cipher unit (BCU) is novel in this design and incorporates various operations common
in many block cipher algorithms. In the beginning of each round of a block cipher algorithm, the
block is in one (or more depending on the block length) of the cryptographic registers. Once the
round starts, the block is rst transferred into special registers in the BCU. One of the important
operations performed in the BCU is index calculation for secure table lookup operation that is
employed in many block cipher implementations to accelerate s-box computation. The lookup
table is formed inside the local memory in order to avoid cache-based side-channel attacks.
While accessing the lookup tables, most RISC-based processors use architectural (general-
purpose) base registers to compute the address of the location of the desired data, which may
be directly related to the secret. However, the architectural registers are not safe places to keep
12
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condential information since they are backed up on the main memory (register spilling); a process
that may leak secret information. Therefore, they must be used carefully. A straightforward ap-
proach is to reset the architectural register used to keep condential data after they are no longer
needed and before they are spilled to the main memory, which is easy to do in Assembly program-
ming. However, this is not an easy task in higher level language implementations since it is up
to the compiler to decide which registers are used in address calculation, which is hard to predict
beforehand for software developers. We use basically two techniques to reset architectural regis-
ters' secret content, using high level language constructs that allow inline assembly instructions
and dening local variables on specied registers. This way, it is easy to keep track of registers that
are used to handle sensitive information to reset them afterward.
Note that certain operations either take multi-cycle or multi-instruction to complete, therefore
temporary values are kept in special-purpose registers. This resembles the multiplication operation
common in RISC processors that puts the high and low parts of the result in two special-purpose
registers, namely HI and LO, respectively. In order to further operate on the result of a multipli-
cation, instructions such as mfhi and mflo are used to move the results to the general-purpose
registers. We adopt the same approach; however, it is required that these special-purpose registers
be not saved in the main memory before process switch operation, which is supervised by the op-
erating system. Thus, operating system support is necessary in secure and isolated execution to
time carefully the context switching in order not to lose data.
5 Local Memory
As mentioned before, we propose to use a small amount of non-cached local memory as a scratch
pad. While the local memory can be implemented as o-chip as well as on-chip memory, it is
preferable to implement it as an on-chip memory since this way it will be much easier to protect
it against threats such as cold-boot attacks [12]. Furthermore, an on-chip local memory is faster.
Using a local on-chip, non-cached memory for protection of processes is not new and is already em-
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ployed in the Cell Broadband Engine Architecture (CBEA) [29] used in PlayStation game consoles
by Sony and BladeServers by IBM.
The local memory is accessed the same way as the main memory, whereby a memory address
is processed by a memory management unit. The memory management unit simply treats any
address in the address range of local memory as a special memory access and sends it to the local
memory. Since the local memory may contain sensitive data belonging in ongoing cryptographic
computation, its content must be protected on context switch where the operating system schedules
another process to run. We identify four methods that can be used to achieve the protection of
sensitive data in local memory. The rst and most straightforward approach is to erase its content on
every context switch, which may raise eciency concerns. The second method can be a partitioning
technique to allocate dierent parts of the local memory to dierent processes, whereby usage is
enforced by checking process identiers. This method can require an increase in the size of the
local memory to accommodate the space requirements of every active process. The third method
can be to give exclusive usage of local memory to a single process at a given time. This method
alleviates the eciency and size concerns while it deprives the other processes of the local memory.
The last method is that only a privileged process can use the local memory and all others are not
allowed to use it. Depending on the implementation and the usage scenario, one of the proposed
methods can be adopted. We do not specify a preference here.
Compilers use registers and memory (stack or heap) to store variables used in a computer
program. When possible, variables are kept in registers for fast execution of instructions. The
register contents are spilled to main memory when the compiler runs out of registers, which are
limited in number. The mapping between registers and memory location is not xed for a variable
and hence every time it is accessed a dierent register can be used for the same variable. In
our processor, we utilize the properties of Tensilica architecture and the associated tool chain to
establish a mapping between the memory locations and cryptographic registers for sensitive data
processing.
When a variable is declared to keep sensitive data, it is dened as a new data type which is
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mapped to a cryptographic register. This basically means that whenever a variable of this new data
type is to be processed it is placed in one of the cryptographic registers. If the variable is of array
type, more than one cryptographic registers are used for this purpose. Since we have only eight
cryptographic registers in our cryptographic register le, they are also subject to register spilling.
Therefore, we need to force this spilling to use a predened memory location in our local memory
for security purpose. Otherwise, the contents of the cryptographic registers would be written to
any location in main memory, which forms a security risk under our threat model. Fortunately,
Tensilica tools allow to initialize a variable of a new type based on the cryptographic register le
by pointer assignment to a pre-initialized memory location as follows:
unsigned long modulus_data[32];
crypto_register *modulus = (crypto_register *) modulus_data;
Here, crypto register is a new data type associated with the cryptographic register le integrated
to the processor core as follows:
regfile crypto_register 128 8 cr.
Also, the keywords (regfile 128 8) indicate that we extend the core processor with a new cryp-
tographic register le that contains eight 128-bit registers. The keyword cr is an internal name
used for the individual registers; namely compiler accesses these registers as cr0, cr1, : : : cr7.
To summarize, we keep sensitive data in the cryptographic registers that are mapped to locations
in our local memory. The sensitive data kept in variables of new type is normally stored in the local
memory. They are placed in the cryptographic registers before processing and when the processing
is nished or when the system runs short of cryptographic registers they are moved (spilled) to the
same location in the local memory. Since both the local memory and the cryptographic registers
are protected under our assumptions, no leakage occurs for sensitive data.
Since the tools provided by Tensilica do not allow to realize the actual local memory, in our
implementations we employ a part of the global memory address space to simulate the local mem-
ory. Therefore, it is, at this point, imperative to discuss the feasibility of realizing on-chip local
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memory, especially for embedded processors. The non-cached local memory for each processor core
is implemented in CBEA processors [29], which has eight cores each featuring 256 KB (kilobyte) of
on-chip local memory. When run in so-called isolated mode, a process running on a core completely
isolates itself from the system (main memory, system bus, other cores, etc.) and relies only on local
memory for data and instructions. The example of the CBEA processor clearly shows that 256 KB
 8 = 2 MB of on-chip memory is feasible to implement on high-end processors.
Nevertheless, our architecture is proposed also for embedded applications and therefore, we
need to develop a deeper insight to the cost of an on-chip local memory in embedded processors.
Apparently, large on-chip memories cannot be supported in embedded processor due the limited
budget in chip area and power dissipation. Fortunately, as we explain in subsequent sections the
cryptographic algorithms we implement require a surprisingly small amount of local memory. Even
2048-bit RSA algorithm, which is the most memory-intensive implementation in our experiments,
needs only about 5,700 B of local memory at most. Therefore, we basically estimate that about
10 KB of local memory is sucient for many symmetric and asymmetric algorithms in use today
if expensive precomputation techniques are not used for acceleration.
Considering one bit of SRAM memory takes about 6-10 transistors to manufacture, 5,700 B of
memory requires 5700 B  6(10) = 34,200 (57,000) transistors. Considering also that a NAND
gate, the number of which is used as a metric called gate-equivalent (GE) to estimate the area
complexity of a design on ASIC, requires four transistors, a local memory of 5,700 B expectedly
takes as much space as a circuit of 8,550 (14,250) GE on ASIC. Note that this is a rough estimate,
thus real gures can only be given after actual implementations. All the same, this simple analysis
shows that realizing a small amount of on-chip memory does not require prohibitively high amount
of chip space.
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6 Secure Use of General-Purpose Registers
In software implementations of cryptographic algorithms, general-purpose registers available to
programmers are needed for various purposes. For example, addresses in memory access instruc-
tions are usually calculated and kept in general-purpose registers. General-purpose registers are,
in general, not secure locations since they are saved in the main memory at special points of exe-
cution (i.e., spilling process) when the operating system runs out of general-purpose registers. As
previously shown in cache-based attacks, it is important to hide the access patterns to memory.
Therefore, general-purpose registers are required to be erased of the addresses (or part of it) after
they are used to access memory.
Since compilers may map a variable to a dierent general-purpose register, and this mapping
can change dynamically every time the variable is used in the program, the developer cannot keep
track of registers used to store sensitive data. To use the same register for a sensitive variable,
we use inline Assembly feature that exists in high-level languages such as C/C++. For example,
a pointer variable that is used to access a lookup table and contains a sensitive address can be
dened as follows in Xtensa LX3 processor:
register unsigned int *table_ptr asm("a13");
Here, the register (a13) is declared as the pointer to hold the address of a particular element of
a lookup table that is being accessed. When the pointer variable is dened in this manner, the
compiler will always use the register (a13) to hold the corresponding address. Note that forcing to
use always the same register for a variable may have performance implications.
7 The New Instruction Set Architecture
Basic integer arithmetic and logic operations are implemented in the protected zone to provide a
wide range of cryptographic algorithms with a secure and ecient execution environment. Some of
these operations are implemented as simple single-cycle instructions such as integer addition and
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various shift operations while more sophisticated operations such as 128-bit multiplication take
multiple cycles. All instructions comply with RISC conventions such as using maximum three
operands per instruction, simple addressing modes stipulating register-to-register arithmetic, etc.
These conventions help keep the data path as simple and regular as possible. For instance, the
latency for instruction fetch can be minimized for short and regularly formatted instructions.
The implementation of instructions for ecient integer and logic operations has been explained
in detail in our previous works [19, 20]. Therefore, we focus only on explaining the new instructions
that allow secure execution of cryptographic operations; but only a subset of new instructions,
which we think are the most representative of the adopted methodology, is explained for space
considerations.
7.1 Predicate Registers and Associated Instructions
Firstly, we mention a special register that plays a key role in secure computations. We use a
one-bit predicate register, namely (p)2, to allow predicated (or conditional) execution of certain
instructions. The predicated instructions are kno n; however as a novelty we allow arithmetic
operations to be performed on a predicate register so that more sophisticated conditions can be
evaluated before the completion of an instruction. Five instructions associated with handling the
predicate register are given in Table 1.
Instruction name Arguments Denition
set predicate p p := 1
reset predicate p p := 0
read predicate p and ar ar := p
or predicate p and carry p OR carry
mf creg2predicate cr and p p := cr[127]
Table 1: Instructions pertaining to predicate registers
2Two predicate bits in [1] are not really necessary since predicated execution can be performed using only a one-bit
predicate register.
18
Page 18 of 47
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
Here, (ar) and (cr) stand for general-purpose and cryptographic registers, respectively. Another
one-bit register carry is set when a previous addition operation produces a carry bit. This carry
bit is copied to the predicate register via or predicate instruction. This way, a carry can be used
as predicate for conditional execution of subsequent instructions.
The instruction mf creg2predicate in Table 1 moves the most signicant bit of the crypto-
graphic register cr to the predicate register (p) while (cr) is shifted to the left by one bit. The
instruction is useful in modular exponentiation and elliptic curve scalar multiplication operations
where the secret exponent (or integer) is kept in the cryptographic register and moved to the predi-
cate registers when needed. In particular, in classical left-to-right binary exponentiation algorithm,
the exponent is kept in a cryptographic register. The exponent bit which is moved to the predicate
register, determines whether a modular multiplication is computed or not.
Three instructions in Table 2 are conditional instructions using the predicate register. The
conditional instructions eliminate the need for conditional branches dependent on sensitive infor-
mation. The rst two instructions cond mv and cond mv c conditionally move the content of a
cryptographic register to another depending on the value of the predicate register. These instruc-
tions are useful again in the exponentiation and elliptic curve scalar multiplication operations,
where certain operations are performed (e.g., modular multiplication) depending on the current
value of the exponent bit, which is currently in the predicate register. For instance, in the Mont-
gomery ladder algorithm [28] for exponentiation, the result of the modular multiplication R0R1
is assigned either to R0 or R1 depending on the value of the current exponent bit. The conditional
move instructions are useful in performing this assignment operation without using branch predic-
tion circuit that leaks information about the secret key [5]. By performing a secret key-dependent
move instruction using the predicate register, the branch prediction attacks are thwarted.
The instruction acc carry is used to perform logical-OR operation on the two special purpose
registers, namely carry and carry2. Having two carry registers is useful in modular arithmetic
operations. For instance, the nal subtraction operation in the Montgomery multiplication algo-
rithm [31, 32] can be securely handled by utilizing two carry bits. In our implementation of the
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Instruction name Arguments Denition
cond mv p, cr d, cr s if p=1 then cr d:=cr s;
cond mv c p, cr d, cr s if p=0 then cr d:=cr s;
acc carry p,
carry p := carry OR carry2;
carry2
Table 2: Special instructions for conditional executions of operations
algorithm, the register carry2 contains the carry out of the Montgomery multiplication operation
before the nal subtraction. We always perform the nal subtraction operation and save the result
in a temporary cryptographic register using carry. The subtraction operation can generate another
carry which is written in carry. If either of these carry registers is set, then the nal subtraction is
necessary. By setting the predicate register (p) to logical-OR of two carry registers, we can perform
a conditional move from the temporary register to the result register. This way, the execution
time does not vary because of the nal subtraction and additional conditional branch, which is
necessary in a conventional implementation, is removed. Therefore, the implementation becomes
more resilient against the side-channel attacks based on branch mispredictions [5].
7.2 Block Cipher Related Instructions
Another special register, sbox in, is useful in table lookup operations used in implementing s-box
computations in block cipher algorithms. Three new instructions pertaining to sbox computation
are given in Table 3.
The special register, sbox in is 32-bit in length and holds a part of the state of a block cipher
during s-box calculations. Before every round, the block (i.e., the current state of the block cipher)
is held in cryptographic registers. The instruction shlcr 2sbox in in Table 3 moves the highest
32-bit of cr to the special register sbox in, where the round operations are applied.
The so-called substitution box (s-box) in a block cipher algorithm is a non-linear function whose
evaluation is usually achieved using lookup tables. This is due to the fact that it requires algebraic
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Instruction name Arguments Denition
shlcr 2sbox in cr, sbox in sbox in:= cr[127:96];
shift left cr by 32 bits;
lookup table op addr, addr:=base addr + sbox in[31:24];
base addr, shift left sbox in by 8 bits;
sbox in
lookup table op word addr, addr:=base addr + (sbox in[31:24]<<2);
base addr, shift left sbox in by 8 bits;
sbox in
Table 3: Special instructions for block cipher related operations
manipulations that are usually too slow to implement in software. Depending on the available
memory, dierent table lookup methods can be considered. The s-box of AES is an 8 8 function
and the basic table lookup technique makes use of a 256 B (byte) memory. A more sophisticated
method suggested by the designers of AES uses about 5 KB of memory to store lookup tables to
achieve higher speedup values. However, as pointed out in many works in the literature [10, 11],
cache-based attacks reveal a fundamental weakness in table lookup methods due to the fact that
the lookup tables are kept in cache memory. Even though these tables are public, key-dependent
access patterns to them in cache memory results in variations in the execution time due to cache
misses.
We address the security concerns pertaining to the usage of lookup tables in s-box evalua-
tions utilizing the architectural support in our processor. First of all, we propose to use a limited
amount of non-cached local memory to store the lookup tables. This approach basically thwarts
all cache-based attacks. However, there is another security concern that arises due to the fact
that we use classical memory access mechanism to read the local memory. Therefore, we develop
a novel, secure method of accessing relatively small lookup tables in the local memory without
using general-purpose registers in address calculations. For this, we use two instructions in Ta-
ble 3: lookup table op and lookup table op word. The instruction lookup table op computes
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the address of the s-box output value precisely, which allows to fetch the desired item from the
lookup table securely, assuming that the table contains 8-bit entries. The calculated address and
s-box output are placed in general-purpose registers which need to be properly handled and erased
afterward. To support larger s-boxes in other block cipher algorithms or larger lookup tables for
faster evaluation of s-box functions, the instruction lookup table op word in Table 3 is used to
return 32-bit entries in the lookup tables.
7.3 Registers in Protected Zone
In a general-purpose processor, there are two kinds of registers used in data processing: i) general-
purpose registers that keep operands for normal instructions and are visible to developers and ii)
special-purpose registers, which are not directly accessible by normal instructions (e.g., program
counter, condition codes/ags, temporary registers for multi-cycle instructions, etc.). General-
purpose registers are part of the register le, which is an array of registers within the processor. The
protected zone, modeled after RISC-based general-purpose processors, also contains both general-
and special-purpose registers. A cryptographic register le (cf. User-Dened Register File in
Figure 1) contains eight 128-bit cryptographic registers that are general purpose in the sense that
they can be used with all user-dened cryptographic instructions in the protected zone.
Other registers in the protected zone are special purpose. Four 128-bit registers are used to
keep temporary data during the execution of arithmetic instructions such as 128-bit addition and
multiplication. Two 128-bit registers, namely crypto HI and crypto LO store higher and lower
128-bit halves of a 128-bit multiplication instruction, respectively (similar to HI and LO registers in
many RISC processors). The predicate register is a one-bit register that allow predicated execution
of instructions, which is needed as a protection against branch prediction attacks. Both of the two
one-bit carry registers (i.e., carry and carry2) are used in big arithmetic operations as explained
in Section 7.1. Finally, there is one register for secure s-box computation: sbox in, which is a
32-bit register used to obtain the address used to access the lookup tables. Table 4 lists all registers
used in the protected zone.
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Register Name General- or Special-Purpose Size (bits) Number
Cryptographic registers General-Purpose 128 8
Temporary registers Special-Purpose 128 4
crypto HI Special-Purpose 128 1
crypto LO Special-Purpose 128 1
predicate register Special-Purpose 1 1
carry registers Special-Purpose 1 2
sbox in Special-Purpose 32 1
Table 4: General and special-purpose registers in the protected zone
7.4 Extending the Protected Zone with New Features and Functional Units
Thanks to the extensibility feature of the recongurable architecture, new functional units with new
features, registers, and register les, etc., can be added to the processor data path. An extension to
the data path of the processor is possible using Tensilica instruction extension (TIE) language. TIE
is, in fact, a hardware description language, similar to VDHL and Verilog, which is used to describe
instruction set extensions to the processor core. The functional behaviors of desired functional
units are dened in TIE language, and TIE compiler will generate and place the RTL (register
transfer level) equivalent blocks into the processor data path. In Appendix A, we demonstrate how
a one-cycle 128-bit adder is encoded in TIE language as RTL. The TIE code in fact implements a
128-bit fast adder whose block diagram is given in Figure 4.
After TIE compiler generates the RTL blocks of the extensions, the processor is synthesized
with the new RTL blocks. Figure 5 illustrates how the integration of the new 128-bit adder would
look like in the ve-stage pipeline of the recongurable processor core. This is a tight integration
since a 128-bit addition operation is now performed in ve clock cycles as in the case of all other
existing instructions of the recongurable processor.
After synthesis stage, the conguration le of the extended processor that can be used to pro-
gram the target FPGA device. ASIC realization requires vendor's assistance in the manufacturing
process. The vendor also provides a tool chain (compiler, debugger, linker, loader, etc.) for software
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development for the extended processor.
The recongurable architecture can always be extended with more powerful functional units for
more security and further acceleration. For instance, we can have two multiplication units in the
protected zone to take advantage of instruction level parallelism. Two multiplication units would
perform two multiplication operations in elliptic curve cryptography and RSA algorithms, simul-
taneously, resulting in signicant speedup in overall computations. However, two multiplication
units naturally requires more chip space and more complicated control circuity in the pipeline of
the processor.
Similarly, the recongurable processor could feature functional units tailored to perform instruc-
tions specic to a certain cryptographic algorithm. For instance, we can always design a highly
optimized hardware module to perform multiple s-box operations of the AES algorithm at the same
time. However, this module would not be used to implement any other block cipher algorithms.
Therefore, the architecture would lose its generic nature.
The proposed architecture adopts two design approaches to increase its feasibility in embedded
applications: i) simple architecture with acceptably low hardware cost and signicant acceleration
of cryptographic algorithms, and ii) generic functional units to support as many cryptographic al-
gorithms as possible. As will be demonstrated in the subsequent sections, the proposed architecture
can be implemented with relatively moderate hardware cost without a decrease in the maximum
applicable clock frequency.
8 Implementation of Cryptographic Algorithms
In this section, we explain our adopted approach to implement major symmetric and asymmetric
cryptographic algorithms and present the timing results in terms of clock cycle count for their per-
formances. We selected three well-known and widely used public key cryptosystems: RSA, elliptic
curve cryptosystems, and Pairing-based cryptographic algorithms. For symmetric cryptographic
algorithms we implemented AES as the block cipher and SHA-1 and SHA-256 as the representatives
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of cryptographic hash functions. Below, we start by presenting timing results for the basic modular
arithmetic operations common in many public-key cryptosystem.
8.1 Modular Arithmetic Operations for Big Numbers
To accelerate the basic arithmetic operations in elds with prime characteristics, we use the func-
tional units presented in [20, 21]. Table 5 lists the complexity of the basic arithmetic operations
used in the computation of the pairing operation in Pairing-based cryptography in number of clock
cycles.
Operation 160-bit 192-bit 256-bit 512-bit
Fp addition 167 174 170 239
Fp subtraction 171 178 174 243
Fp multiplication 905 1044 830 2167
Fp multiplication by -2 295 309 300 418
Fp inversion 36,565 42,925 55,478 140,049
Table 5: Timings of modular arithmetic operations in number of clock cycles
Similarly, in Table 6, we present the timing results for the prime extension eld arithmetic
used in pairing-based cryptography. We provide the timing results only for two extension degrees
of 2 and 4, namely F 2p and F
4
p since we use pairing operations dened for these two elds. The
timings of additions and subtractions for prime extension elds are not included here as they can
be accurately estimated from modular addition and subtraction operations in Table 5. F 4p inversion
and multiplication timings are not given for 512-bit since our pairing implementation uses only the
embedding degree of 2 over 512-bit prime eld. One obvious observation from Tables 5 and 6 is
that the major operation in F 2p and F
4
p inversion calculations is the inversion in the prime eld Fp.
We use irreducible polynomials of the form X2    and the tower eld approach in the con-
struction of prime extension elds for a faster computation of the basic eld arithmetic. Note also
that these implementations are developed using our secure programming technique in the protected
zone.
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Operation 256-bit 512-bit
F 2p multiplication 3,775 7,836
F 4p multiplication 13,541 -
F 2p inversion 60,983 152,738
F 4p inversion 77,819 -
Table 6: Timings of arithmetic operations in extension elds in number of clock cycles
Algorithm Base Fast Secure
Architecture on protected protected
RSA-1024 132,334,584 9,215,168 14,831,132
RSA-2048 NA 66,728,848 107,173,686
ECC-160 5,684,844 2,524,498 4,683,325
ECC-256 21,509,576 3,649,338 7,213,678
ECC-512 160,109,439 16,979,307 33,893,033
Table 7: Clock count for RSA and ECC
8.2 RSA and Elliptic Curve Implementations
The timing results of an RSA exponentiation and an ECC scalar point multiplication are given in
Table 7 in terms of number of clock cycles. Note that all implementations are done in C language
with some lines in inline Assembly and implementations in full Assembly are expected to yield
better performance.
For both RSA and ECC, we list the timing results for three implementations: base, fast,
and secure Table 7. The base implementation is implemented without using the cryptographic
acceleration and therefore it is not secure (not to mention the fact that the implementations are
prohibitively slow). Fast implementations execute completely in isolated manner, whereby all
computations are performed in the protected zone. But they are vulnerable to simple side-channel
attacks since we use the binary left-to-right exponentiation algorithm in the computations of RSA
exponentiation as well as elliptic curve scalar multiplication, which is vulnerable to the simple power
analysis (SPA). In order to harden these operations against the SPA and branch prediction attacks,
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we employed the Montgomery Ladder algorithm [28] along with conditional move instructions (cf.
Section 7.1) in our secure implementations of RSA and ECC, hence the secure implementation.
The Montgomery Ladder algorithm is a typical example of algorithm level countermeasures
against the simple power analysis attacks. It is used in RSA exponentiation and elliptic curve
scalar point multiplication operations. Independent of the exponent (the scalar integer in ECC),
which is the secret information, the algorithm always performs the same operations (one modular
multiplication and one modular squaring for every bit of the secret exponent in RSA). Therefore,
no information leaks due to secret key dependent operations. We further eliminate any remaining
dependency on the secret key by using conditional move instructions, which remove any conditional
statement such as the if statement that checks the bits of the secret exponent.
The dierences in the clock cycle counts of the fast on protected and the secure protected
implementations (see the third and the fourth columns in Table 7) are due to two factors. Firstly,
the Montgomery ladder algorithm always performs a multiplication (point addition in ECC) for
each bit of the exponent while binary exponentiation algorithms perform a multiplication only if
the corresponding exponent bit is 1. Secondly, conditional move instructions based on predicate
registers require a higher number of clock cycles.
For comparison, our implementations, both fast and secure, greatly outperform another 1024-
bit RSA implementation on the same Xtensa processor in [33] where one exponentiation operation
takes about 24:32 million clock cycles. In a more recent work [24], in which the FPGA realization
of the extended processor runs at 24 MHz and execution times are given for modular multiplication
only, one 1024-bit modular multiplication takes 25; 418 clock cycles. In comparison, the same
operation takes 7; 654 clock cycles in our processor. Considering our architecture can run at a
twice faster clock frequency of 50 MHz, the speedup is about 6:92.
It turns out that the required sizes of the local memory are surprisingly low for RSA and ECC
implementations; maximum 5,700 Byte (B) is needed for the fast implementation of RSA and it
is only 1; 936 B for ECC. RSA memory requirement in fast implementation can be reduced to
as low as 1; 860 B at the expense of 17   18% deterioration in speed. The secure RSA imple-
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mentation requires only 2; 112 B memory space. Considering our former disccussion about the
feasibility of impelementing local memory on-chip in Section 5, the local memory requirements of
our implementations are very low.
8.3 AES Implementations
In encryption (symmetric as well as asymmetric), we can assume that the plaintext is usually
placed rst in the main memory, which is not a secure place. Our implementations take a block of
plaintext (128-bit or 16 B in AES) from the main memory and place it in the local memory, which
is a secure place. During the computation of the AES rounds, anything computed remains in the
protected zone; i.e. local memory, cryptographic or special purpose registers. After the nal round
of the block cipher is executed, the resulting ciphertext block is transferred to the main memory.
One can argue that an adversary who already compromised the main memory can easily obtain
the plaintext while it is in the main memory. Therefore, it can further be argued that the proposed
protection does not help to secure the encryption operation. However, the primary goal of our
architecture is to protect the secret key used in the encryption process. Even if the main memory
is compromised, our architecture can still carry on encryption (or decryption) operations without
leaking sensitive information.
We developed two C implementations of the AES algorithm and the results are given in Table 8
along with those of other implementations (some of them on similar embedded platforms). In the
table we provide operating clock frequencies for the designs, for which FPGA implementations are
provided. Our rst implementation, referred as the limited memory version, utilizes a lookup table
with 256 entries where each entry is 8-bit, which is stored in the local memory. It is basically
used in the direct evaluation of 8  8 s-box of the AES algorithm. As seen in the table, our
implementation is outperformed by those in [24], [34] and [35]. The implementation in [35] is a
bit-sliced implementation. Our implementation does not use the bit-slicing technique, therefore, it
can work in any mode of operation. A bit-sliced implementation in our architecture would possibly
yield a better performance, which we leave as a future work. Note also that the implementation
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in [24] uses a slower clock frequency.
Implementation Hardware support Performance (cycles)
[36] on ARM7TDMI - 1675
[37] on AMD Opteron - 2699
[35] on CRISP Bit-sliced + 2203
lookup tables
[35] on CRISP Bit-sliced + 1222 (@30 MHz)
lookup table +
bit-level permutation
[33] on Xtensa - 1400
[24] on LEON 3 Hardware support 463 (@24 MHz)
Reference implementation [34] on XTensa No hardware support 859 (@50 MHz)
this work - limited memory on protected zone 1334 (@50 MHz)
this work - fast on protected zone 863 (@50 MHz)
Table 8: Comparison of AES Implementations
The implementation [34] uses ve lookup tables of size 1 KB each resulting in about 5 KB
memory for table lookup approach. However, this implementation has been shown to succumb to
cache-based attacks. Our second implementation modies the implementation [34] by using the
local memory for lookup tables and secure memory access techniques. As seen in Table 8, our
fast implementation provides the same performance as the reference implementation [34] without
sacricing the security.
The AES algorithm requires only 464 B of scratch pad memory for the limited memory version
while the requirement is 5; 328 B for the fast version. The scratch pad memory required by the fast
implementation of RSA can also be used to enable the execution of the fast version of AES.
8.4 Implementing Pairing-Based Cryptography and Protocols Based on Pairing
Elliptic curve based pairing operation recently emerged as a very important cryptographic prim-
itive and already became an essential part of many cryptographic schemes and protocols [38, 39,
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40, 41, 42, 43, 44]. Therefore, it is important to implement pairing operation on embedded devices
eciently. However, pairing operation is costly and generally prohibitively slow on embedded pro-
cessors [45]. Therefore, full or partial hardware support for acceleration is a frequently adopted
methodology [25]. In this section, we demonstrate that it is possible to accelerate pairing operation
signicantly if implemented in our protected zone. But, we will rst provide a brief introduction
to pairing operation dened over elliptic curves to enable a better understanding of our implemen-
tations.
8.5 Bilinear Pairing and Tate Pairing Operation
Bilinear pairing is a function that maps two points in elliptic curve groups to a subgroup of the
extension eld Fpk ; more formally e : G1 G2 ! G3, where G3 = Fpk , k is the embedding degree,
and p is the prime characteristic of the eld Fp, over which the elliptic curve group G1 is dened.
In practice, all three groups have the same order r and the embedding degree k is a small integer.
An important property that makes the pairing operation interesting for cryptographic applications
is its bilinearity
e(aP; bQ) = e(P;Q)ab = e(bP; aQ) = e(aP;Q)b = e(P; bQ)a;
where P and Q (i.e., uppercase letters) are elliptic curve points while a and b (i.e., small case
letters) are integers. The Tate pairing, which is one of the most ecient pairings widely used
in cryptography can be computed using Miller's algorithm, followed by a nal exponentiation
operation. The BKLS algorithm [46], described in Algorithm 1, is an ecient method to compute
the Tate pairing.
The function g in Algorithm 1 takes two elliptic curve points from G1 and one point from G2 and
returns an element in Fpk . In our implementations we use two values for embedding degree, namely,
k = 2 or 4. In addition, we use the same elliptic curve for the groups G1 and G2. Specically, while
G1 is the elliptic curve over Fp, G2 is the same curve dened over Fpk . Since we use the quadratic
twist [47], [45] of the elliptic curve for k = 4, the elements of G2 have coordinates from Fp2 in both
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Algorithm 1 BKLS Algorithm for Computing Tate Pairing e(P;Q)
Require: r; p; P;Q
Ensure: f = e(P;Q)
// Miller's Loop
f = 1
T = P
n = r   1
for i from blog2 rc   2 downto 0 do
f = f2  g(T; T;Q)
if ni = 1 then
f = f  g(T; P;Q)
end if
end for
f = f (p
k 1)=r // Final Exponentiation
cases (i.e., k = 2 or 4). The irreducible polynomials x2+1 and x2+2 can be used to construct the
quadratic eld Fp2 . Consequently, the elements of Fp2 can be represented as x+ iy, where i =
p 1
or
p 2 and x; y 2 Fp. For more information, see [47].
The function g can be computed using Algorithm 2, where the elliptic curve points A;B 2 G1
are given in projective coordinates (e.g., A = (Xa; Ya; Za)) while we use the ane representation
for the point Q 2 G2 (i.e., Q = (xq; yq)). Note that the point A is modied by the function g.
Algorithm 2 Computation of g Function in Tate Pairing
Require: A = (Xa; Ya; Za); B = (Xb; Yb; Zb); Q = (xq; yq), where A;B 2 G1 and Q 2 G2
Ensure: m = g(A;B;Q)
C = A+B // elliptic curve point addition
 = Z3aYb   Ya
m = YaZc   (xqZ3a +XaZa)  i(yqZ3aZc)
A = C
The nal exponentiation f (p
k 1)=r can be computed using the Frobenius as explained in [45].
Moreover, two methods are utilized to accelerate the pairing operation. The rst method is a
precomputation technique that can be used when the the rst elliptic curve point P in e(P;Q)
is xed. Note that the Miller's loop in Algorithm 1 computes the same multiple of the P inde-
pendent of Q. Thus, we can precompute the elliptic curve additions in the computation of g and
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save them in a lookup table. This eliminates costly elliptic curve operations during the Miller's
loop. The second acceleration method (i.e., Lucas sequence method) can be applied in the nal
exponentiation operation in case k = 2 (cf. [48] for the application of the Lucas sequences to the
nal exponentiation).
8.6 Our Implementations
We implemented the Tate pairing operation to see if it can be computed eciently on our archi-
tecture. For elliptic curve arithmetic and pairing operations we use two elliptic curves provided in
MIRACL library [49]. The rst elliptic curve uses a 256-bit prime eld Fp with embedding degree
k = 4 for pairing operations. The extension elds F 2p and F
4
p are constructed using tower eld
approach and irreducible polynomials of the form X2 . Since the base point order of the elliptic
curve group is a 160-bit number and embedding degree is 4, this selection of pairing operation
provides 80-bit security level, which is suitable for embedded applications.
The second curve is constructed over 512-bit prime eld with the embedding degree k = 2
for pairing operation and provides also 80-bit security. The second curve is used for the pairing
operation with precomputation for the case when the rst point in the pairing is xed. Results for
both implementations are given in Table 9. Note that the results for the precomputation case are
about two times faster than those in [25], which is also based on instruction set extension technique.
Operation 256-bit 512-bit
Point addition 13,509 32,915
Point doubling 9,793 21,581
Point multiplication 2,478,410 5,122,758
Miller's Loop 10,928,255 29,77,028 (with precomputation)
Final Exponentiation 5,764,617 1,889,324 (with Lucas sequence)
Pairing (Total) 16,692,872 4,866,352
Table 9: Timings of elliptic curve and pairing operations in number of clock cycles
In Table 9, the timing results for elliptic curve point arithmetic are also included since they are
used together with pairing operations in many cryptographic schemes. Note that a scalar point
multiplication in Table 9 is much faster than those in Table 7 for the same precision since elliptic
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curves used in pairing operations have a much smaller base point order, which determines the
required number of point addition and doubling operations.
One pairing operation on our processor running at 50 MHz takes about 334 ms for 256-bit case
while it is 97.3 ms for 512-bit case where we use precomputation. Note that the reason we choose
50 MHz as the clock frequency is that it is typical for embedded systems and that we are able use
50 MHz for the synthesis of our processor on our FPGA board. In the precomputation case, two
coordinates of the point P in Algorithm 1 and integer  in Algorithm 2 are precomputed. The order
of the curve used in the implementation is a 160-bit integer, and  and elliptic curve coordinates
are 512-bit numbers. Consequently, the precomputation method requires about 10 KB of memory.
Many pairing-based cryptographic algorithms and protocols also make use of other operations
such as elliptic curve arithmetic besides pairing operation. For example, the privacy-preserving
authentication protocol introduced in [44] uses one pairing and seven elliptic curve multiplica-
tion operations for a wireless user to authenticate to an access point. This workload on a user
who may have an embedded system to connect to the network can be prohibitively heavy. How-
ever, when implemented on our proposed architecture the computation by a user takes about only
36; 520; 152 = 16; 692; 872 + 2; 478; 410  7 clock cycles. If a clock frequency of 50 MHz is used
for the processor, the computation of all cryptographic operations can be completed in less than a
second; i.e. approximately 731 ms, which is quite acceptable for such an involved computation.
One pairing operation requires that a diverse set of operations be executed such as the basic
arithmetic operations in Fp and Fp2 , elliptic curve arithmetic operations, etc. The detailed call
graph for our implementation of the pairing operation is given in Figure 6 in Appendix B. These
operations in the call graph require local variables to store temporary results, which are sensitive
and therefore kept in the local memory. For this, we calculate and allocate the required amount
of memory needed throughout the call graph in advance. Note that operations in the same level
of the call graph can share the same memory area. The total amount of the memory needed for
the Pairing operation is less than 5 KB (not including the memory space for the precomputation
method in Table 9).
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8.7 Secure Implementation of Hash Functions on Cryptographic Unit
In cryptographic hash computation for a given message, the condentiality is not an issue since
anything computed is public. Therefore, it is important to guarantee the correct computation of a
hash value; in a sense what is important is the integrity. For instance, if the intermediate values
during the hash computation are stored in the main memory, an attacker who has access to the
address space of a cryptographic application, can modify them and tweak the computation that
will produce an incorrect hash value, which may be the value intended by the attacker. In our
architecture, it is easy to secure the hash computation by simply saving the hash block in the
protected local memory.
General-purpose registers can be used for the hash operations and hence the hash block can
temporarily be kept in these registers. However, these registers must be backed up on the secure
memory before these registers are spilled into the memory. The backing up the hash block can be
performed as many times as required. Since the processing of one message block can be nished
relatively fast, and implementing the core hash functionality for a message block is possible in a
single function (method), it is usually sucient to back up the hash block after the processing of one
message block is completed. Figure 3 illustrates the secure computation of the hash of a message. In
the gure, IV and MBi stand for the initial vector and the i-th message block, respectively. In hash
computations, the message is partitioned into xed length blocks, each of which is processed within
the core function of the hash known as the digest. If the message is not a multiple of the block
length, a padding scheme is applied for the last message block. After the nalization step the hash
value is written back to the local memory. The backup operation in Figure 3 represents spilling
all registers holding the current hash block to the local memory. If, for instance, the processor
context switches to another process after computing a hash block corresponding to the message
block (i   1), for the resumption of hash computation (for the block i and onward) on the next
context switch back to the hash computation, the hash block (i 1) is read from the local memory.
During the computation of hash functions, general-purpose registers of the base processor are
34
Page 34 of 47
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
Digest
Secure
Local 
Memory
IV MB1
Digest
MB2
Backup Backup
Digest
MBN+padding
Backup
Finalization
Step
Store
Hash
value
Figure 3: Secure hash computation using local memory
used. These registers must be mapped to the secure local memory in order for them to be backed
up in the local memory when needed.
In our secure implementation of the SHA-1 function, computing the hash of a 512-bit message
takes 1529 clock cycles. The same computation takes 1; 602 clock cycles in the architecture in [35]
(another implementation in the same architecture [35] using lookup tables takes 1441 clock cycles).
Note that the maximum applicable clock frequency in [35] is 30 MHz while we can apply 50 MHz to
our architecture. We also implemented SHA-256 (256-bit version of SHA-2) in the same manner to
provide the performance result for 128-bit security level and we found out that the hash of a 512-bit
message is computed in 7; 550 clock cycles. In comparison, the same operation takes 6; 255 clock
cycles in the architecture in [24] at a maximum clock frequency of 24 MHz. In both cases, our
overall execution times are better than those in [35] and [24].
For hash-based MAC computations, in order to protect secret key, hash blocks should also be
protected in the same way as the blocks of AES, which will slow down the computation.
9 Implementation Results
We implemented our protected zone and integrated it into an embedded processor core, namely
Xtensa LX3 by Tensilica [30]. Design choices for the extensions are made in such a way that the
applicable clock frequency is not aected. The Tensilica tool chain estimates that the protected
zone takes a chip area of 100; 279 equivalent gate count in an ASIC realization while the base
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processor takes about 88; 000 equivalent gate count. Therefore, the total size of the processor is
estimated as 188; 279 equivalent gate count in an ASIC realization.
The results for an ASIC realization are rough estimates and the tools do not report reliable
gures for maximum applicable clock frequency (The base processor runs at a maximum clock
frequency of 320 MHz). Therefore, we also synthesized the design into an FPGA target device,
and generated conguration les to program Avnet LX200 board that features Xilinx Virtex-4 type
FPGA. This basically means that the reported implementation gures are obtained after placement-
and-routing. The number of slices used in the design is reported to be 27; 401; and 14; 432 slices of
the total number are used to implement the protected zone. Note that there are 89; 088 slices in
the FGPA device. No degradation in clock frequency is reported by the synthesis tools; 50 MHz
maximum clock frequency is achieved for the design. Note that, the implementation gures do not
include the area which will be required for the local memory.
We compare the implementation results with the architecture in a recent work [24], which
reects the state-of-the-art in instruction set extensions for cryptographic algorithms. The design
in [24] is based on LEON 3 microprocessor architecture and realized on Xilinx Virtex 5 FPGA.
Since the processor cores and target devices (FPGA) are dierent, a direct comparison is not fair.
However, relative increases in areas (i.e., number of slices) can give an idea whether the overhead is
reasonable and/or acceptable. In [24], when all extensions are considered, the relative increase in the
number of slices is approximately 207% (the base processor and extensions take 2; 338 and 4; 830
slices, respectively) as opposed to an increase of about 111% in our architecture. The relative
increase incurred in the area due to the extensions, while signicant, is typical and acceptable.
Another architecture [35], claiming to be lightweight and supporting only block ciphers and SHA-1
algorithm, takes 9; 500 slices on Virtex II architecture.
The equivalent gate count of the base Xtensa LX3 microprocessor (i.e., 88; 000 equivalent gates)
reects the fact that its architecture is optimized for ASIC realizations. This also explains relatively
high slice count on the FGPA device, for which the processor is not optimized. The gate count
of the base processor (88; 000) and the additional gate count due to the protected zone (100; 279)
36
Page 36 of 47
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
are relatively low gures, which are feasible for embedded applications. For comparison with an
equivalent embedded core, we can inspect the deeply-embedded ARM processor core, Cortex-R4 [50],
which has an equivalent gate count of 290; 000 for the maximum clock frequency of 934 MHz. The
gate count can be as low as 150; 000 for lower clock frequencies.
To compare the hardware cost of the proposed architecture with cryptographic accelerators,
we select two high performance designs specialized for elliptic curve cryptography to give an idea
of their hardware costs. The rst design is a high-speed elliptic curve accelerator [51], which
takes 750; 000 gate count operating at 200 MHz. A low-power power design [52] for elliptic curve
cryptography takes about 34; 000 gates and operates at 200 MHz.
In summary, our design features an embedded processor core with a generic support for many
cryptographic algorithms and its hardware budget is similar to those of similar embedded systems.
10 Conclusion
We designed, implemented and realized a protected zone in an embedded processor that supports
ecient and secure execution of cryptographic algorithms. We estimated the area overhead of the
protected zone for the ASIC implementation. We also provided area usage on an FPGA device
after placement-and-routing for the full design including an embedded base processor and the
protected zone. Since the number and organization of the subsystems in the protected zone are
carefully designed, we observed that the area overhead is acceptable for an embedded processor
while no deterioration in maximum applicable clock frequency is reported in FPGA realization.
We outlined the principles of software implementations of cryptographic algorithms so that the
resulting executables run in a secure and isolated manner. Since the protected zone is specically
tailored for the cryptographic application domain, we achieved superior time performance of major
cryptographic algorithms compared to both those reported in the literature and those in the base
processor. The protected zone benets software implementations of many cryptographic algorithms
since the selected design methodology is not aimed at favoring a particular class of algorithms.
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11 Appendix A: Addition Unit in TIE language
In this section, we explain how a new functional unit in the protected zone will be implemented
and integrated to the base processor's pipelined data path. As an example, we consider the 128-
bit adder unit used in big integer arithmetic for public key cryptography algorithms. The block
diagram of the adder is given in Figure 4. Three 64-bit adder units are employed in the design,
where two of them are used to implement the addition of the upper 64 bits of the integers. They,
in fact, perform the same operation, one with carry and the other without carry. The carry out
from the lower 64-bit addition is used to select the correct result for the upper 64-bit addition. The
sizes of the adders are selected in such a way that the maximum applicable clock frequency is not
aected.
Adder
6464
Adder
6464
Adder
6464
a0b0a1a1 b1b1
cin=0cin=0cin=1
MUX
01
cout
c0c1
64 64
64
64
1
Figure 4: Adder unit for 128-bit integer addition operation [20]
The 128-bit adder unit is described in TIE language as follows:
function [128:0] add128 ( [127:0] oper1, [127:0] oper2, carry) shared
{
wire [64:0] hi, hi_with_carry, hi_wo_carry, lo;
wire c_in_1, c_in_0;
assign c_in_1 = 1'b1;
assign c_in_0 = 1'b0;
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assign lo = TIEadd(oper1[63:0], oper2[63:0], carry);
assign hi_wo_carry = TIEadd(oper1[127:64], oper2[127:64], c_in_0);
assign hi_with_carry = TIEadd(oper1[127:64], oper2[127:64], c_in_1);
assign hi = TIEmux(lo[64], hi_wo_carry, hi_with_carry);
assign add128 = {hi, lo[63:0]};
}
As can be seen from the TIE language description, the language is similar to other hardware
description languages such as VHDL and Verilog. TIE compiler takes the description and generates
an RTL block which is ready to be integrated into the processor core. A synthesizer tool takes
both the new RTL blocks and the base processor as input and integrates the RTL blocks into the
processor core. As an example, Figure 5 illustrates the integration of the 128-bit adder into the
ve-stage pipeline of the base processor. From the gure, we can easily see that it is a very tight
integration and new instructions using the new functional units in the protected zone are treated as
normal instructions of the base processor. The new instructions are scheduled in the same manner
as the other instructions and go through all pipeline stages.
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Figure 5: Tight integration of functions units in the protected zone into processor pipeline
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12 Appendix B: Call Graph of Pairing Computation
In Figure 6, a detailed call graph of the pairing algorithm is given. Since temporary results during
the computation can be sensitive, all local variables needed in dierent levels of the call graph
are mapped to the local memory in the protected zone. The local memory is an extension to the
processor core, and therefore we rst compute the amount of memory needed for all operations in
the graph. The dashed lines in the gure represents memory requests by the operations in each
level. In our implementation, operations in the same level of the graph share the same memory
locations to optimize the memory usage.
Pairing
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Loop
Point
Addition
Final
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Figure 6: Call graph of pairing computation and local memory usage
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